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I. Agricultural Credit: From success Story to Crisis 
In many ways, for a long time Costa Rica had been a success 
story with respect to agricultural credit. The authorities had 
become interested in small-farmer credit issues as far back as 
1914, when the first state-owned bank, the Banco Internacional de 
Costa Rica (today, the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) was created. 
At that time, the Cajas Rurales de Credito were organized, "to 
liberate small farmers from the usurious conditions of moneylend-
er loans, and to stimulate production of basic grains for domes-
tic consumption." 
By the end of 1915, the bank had established 27 Cajas and 
was lending to 1,000 small farmers the equivalent of 15 percent 
of its porfolio (Gonzalez-Vega, 1973). Moreover, since the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, the coffee beneficios had oper-
ated, in effect, as small rural banks. Even today, loans from 
coffee processors and cooperatives represent an efficient credit 
delivery system that finances a substantial portion of the credit 
demand of thousands of coffee growers (Morris, 1982). 
When in 1936, the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica was con-
verted into the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica ( BNCR) , the Cajas 
became the Juntas Rurales de Credito Agricola (rural boards for 
agricultural credit), but the concept of credit allocation by a 
board of local community members was maintained. 
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In 1957 the other three state-owned banks were legally re-
quired to provide small-farmer credit. The Oficinas de Credito 
al Peaueiio Aqricul tor were created as part of their Commercial 
Departments (Gonzalez-Vega, 1973). These Oficinas never amounted 
to more than an additional window (credit line) at these other 
banks, usually located in major towns only. The amounts which 
they disbursed were not insignificant, nevertheless. 
As a consequence of these institutional innovations and of 
the generalized process of financial deepening that the country 
experienced during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, Costa Rican 
farmers enjoyed a comparatively ample access to credit (Gonzalez-
Vega, 1988). While in the early 1970s, it was estimated that on-
ly about 5 percent of all farmers in Africa and about 15 percent 
of those in Asia and Latin America had had access to institution-
al loans, this proportion was over 30 percent in the case of Cos-
ta Rica (World Bank, 1974, Donald, 1976). If bank credit deliv-
ered to coffee producers through the benef icios is considered as 
formal credit, this proportion was close to an exceptionally high 
45 percent (comparable to Korea at that time). 
Moreover, agriculture always enjoyed substantial shares of 
the total bank loan portfolio. By 1960, while the average propor-
tion of agricultural loans with respect to total domestic credit 
for the private sector was 22 percent among 18 Latin American 
countries, it was 60 percent for Costa Rica, the highest propor-
tion in the Hemisphere (Adams, 1971). By 1973, these proportions 
were 24 percent for Latin America and 52 percent for Costa Rica. 
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Table 1. National Banking System. Credit Volumes. Index: 
1978:100. 
1970 1975 1978 1981 1982 1983 
Credit outstanding 
(end of December): 
Total 50.3 71.5 100.0 46.1 35.5 51. 0 
Crops 78.5 72.9 100.0 51.5 46.0 72.6 
Livestock 56.1 78.0 100.0 43.4 37.7 55.9 
Industry 38.1 69.5 100.0 38.8 33.2 51. 0 
Commerce 24.3 89.6 100.0 65.9 46.7 42.9 
services 31. 7 57.0 100.0 37.6 19.2 21.9 
Housing 40.1 55.9 100.0 54.1 32.6 39.5 
Personal 41.8 86.5 100.0 46.7 18.6 15.1 
New loans granted 
during the year: 
Total 57.9 87.7 100.0 50.7 48.5 58.1 
Crops 94.6 102.7 100.0 75.8 91.2 106.9 
Livestock 50.1 65.3 100.0 47.1 60.8 65.6 
Industry 49.2 90.6 100.0 32.7 37.2 48.0 
Commerce 38.3 133.8 100.0 103.0 58.7 59.9 
services 84.9 126.7 100.0 70.7 11.2 14.5 
Housing 23.6 56.7 100.0 40.4 21. 6 36.8 
Personal 20.4 40.9 100.0 25.3 10.4 13.7 
Source: Gonzalez-Vega (1985) 
That is, the agricultural sector showed more flexibility to 
adjust to the recession, while the authorities channelled funds 
towards this sector, in view of its importance in terms of export 
earnings and food prices. As a consequence, the share of agri-
culture in the portfolio of credit outstanding grew to 51 per-
cent, while the share of the sector in the flow of new loans 
jumped to 63 percent. Although the real value of the amounts 
disbursed was low, the proportion increased sharply. 
7 
Indeed, during the 1980s, the proportion of delinquent loans 
in the portfolios of the state-owned banks increased to alarming 
levels, reflecting either the lack of ability or the absence of 
incentives for farmers to repay their loans, as well as the re-
duced willingness and/or ability of the banks to collect those 
loans. This made those farmers not eligible for more credit. 
In some cases the crisis as well as other changes in the ex-
ternal and domestic circumstances may have resulted in difficul-
ties to repay. In many cases, however, the expectation that the 
interest rates attached to new loans would be higher, the fear to 
lose their position in the rationing queue, or the expectation of 
rescheduling options may have represented strong incentives for 
borrowers to delay repayment. The resulting high level of arrears 
and default further reduced the effective volume of the loanable 
funds available for new projects and seriously compromised the 
financial viability of the state-owned banks. 
These developments have been accompanied by intense lobby-
ing, legislation, and demands from pressure groups for government 
intervention, to guarantee that a minimum share of the loan port-
folio be allocated to the agricultural sector, to secure the con-
tinuation of interest-rate subsidies for agriculture and small 
farmers, and to obtain the reschedulling and, potentially, a mo-
ratorium of old delinquent debts. 
Moreover, several international donors have been formally 
approached by the Costa Rican authorities, with the request that 
substantial new amounts of foreign funds be channelled into agri-
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country's comparative advantages, to new areas of potentially 
greater private and social profitability. In the absence of 
these resource reallocations, the economy will not optimally 
respond to the challenges and opportunities of the new economic 
environment. 
Moreover, for Costa Rican firms and producers, including 
numerous farmers, bank loans have traditionally represented the 
most important source of funds, both for investment and for work-
ing capital. Particularly in the more modern (capital-intensive) 
sectors of the economy, there has always been a heavy reliance on 
debt, rather than on equity and other financial instruments. on 
the supply side, on the other hand, loans from the four state-
owned commercial banks have traditionally represented the largest 
share of the available loanable funds. 
The dominance of the state-owned banks has been a result of 
the legally-sanctioned monopoly of the mobilization of monetary 
deposits, enjoyed by these banks. Given the large share of mone-
tary instruments in the portfolios of financial assets of firms 
and households, a common feature of developing countries, this 
monopoly has given the state-owned banks an exceptional advan-
tage, despite major deficiencies in their operations, and has re-
presented a serious restriction to entry into financial markets. 
Furthermore, the performance of the NBS both contributed to 
and was seriously jeopardized by the crisis. From a structural 
perspective, in the early 1980s the NBS was considered to be 
"slow, excessively conservative, and incapable of significantly 
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Almost insignificant in the early 1980s, on the other hand, 
the share of the private banks and of the private regulated fi-
nancieras in total domestic loan portfolios rapidly augmented in 
recent years. These private entities have financed their lending 
operations with their own equity, foreign borrowing (and deposit 
mobilization offshore), and with domestic time deposits (certifi-
cados de inversion) with terms over six months (over three months 
recently). An amendment of the Central Bank Law in August of 1984 
enabled these private banks to rediscount with the Central Bank, 
when the funds used had been provided by international donors. 
This amendment gave USAID the opportunity to provide sub-
stantial support to the private banks, whose share in the total 
flow of new loans expanded from about 6 percent in 1983, to 21 
percent in 1986 and further increased in 1987. During the same 
period, the share of the private regulated f inancieras increased 
from 3. 8 to 7. 3 percent of the total, as funds shifted towards 
intermediaries able to offer more attractive rewards to deposi-
tors. These entities have been subject to less severe Central 
Bank constraints (reserve requirements) and regulations and have 
offered their clientele higher quality financial services. 
Also, the Bolsa Nacional de Val ores, several savings and 
loan associations (mutuales), and about 50 credit unions, par-
ticularly those associated with FEDECREDITO, have further con-
tributed to the diversification of the Costa Rican financial sys-
tem and to greater competition in the market for funds. The de-
positors have been the beneficiaries from this competition. 
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This is not surprising, however. The infrastructure and 
expertise requirements of industrial lending more closely match 
the capabilities and inclination of the private banks, than is 
the case with agricultural credit. Also, risk is easier to eval-
uate, industrial loans are larger, and average administration 
costs are lower. 
On the other hand, before 1985 the private banks had granted 
less than one percent of the total flow of new loans for agricul-
ture. By 1986, however, this proportion had increased beyond five 
percent, but the agricultural lending activities of the private 
commercial banks were still highly concentrated in a few, large 
loans and were primarily directed towards a few export crops, 
particularly coffee and non-traditional products. 
Between 1983 and 1986, the share of agricultural loans in 
the portfolio of the private banks ranged between 2. 2 and 6. 9 
percent. Although their lending for agriculture will inevitably 
expand, this will be a slow process. Mostly, they will lend for 
agricultural projects of clients that are well known to them, due 
to earlier non-agricultural loan transactions. It will take a 
long time until they develop the infrastructure and expertise re-
quired. In addition, the high cost of their funds will reduce 
their competitiveness in this market. Thus, a share of lending 
equivalent to what they have acquired in the industrial credit 
market is unlikely in the near future. This will in part re-
flect, nevertheless, the market imperfection that results from 
the state-owned banks' monopoly of monetary deposit mobilization. 
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In general, the contributions of the financial system to in-
vestment and growth will depend on the volume of resources inter-
mediated (both deposits and loans), measured in real terms, and 
of the efficiency with which financial services are supplied. 
This efficiency is best measured by the magnitude and dispersion 
of the transactions costs imposed on all (actual and potential) 
market participants as well as by the dispersion of the marginal 
rates of return of the investments and productive activities un-
dertaken (the degree of market fragmentation). 
Conclusion Number Two: 
The main objective of financial policy reforms and donor in-
terventions must be to increase the real flow of domestic 
claims on resources that are intermediated and to reduce the 
transactions costs for all market participants (depositors, 
intermediaries, and borrowers). 
In the past, rigid financial policies constrained the growth 
and modernization of the Costa Rican financial system. While the 
absence of inflation through the 1970s contributed to the expan-
sion of the volumes of domestic financial assets and liabilities, 
in real terms, distortions in the structure of interest rates, 
loan targeting, and other quantitative credit controls (topes de 
cartera) contributed to market fragmentation and the non-price 
rationing of loans. 
Moreover, excessive bureaucracy in the state-owned banks, 
detailed regulations, and unnecessary reliance on Central Bank 
directives on the part of the commercial banks, sharply increased 
transactions costs and rigidity in the operation of the banks. 
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The USAID further contributed to the expansion of the pri-
vate banks, within a new policy environment which increasingly 
promoted competition. Some of the goals of the World Bank struc-
tural adjustment program have also promoted the development of a 
more efficient financial market. 
Conclusion Number Three: 
Fiscal and monetary control is key for successful financial 
growth. This requires careful Central Bank stabilization 
policies. Financial-policy reforms, in order to promote com-
petition, to bring interest rates closer to their equilib-
rium levels, and to reduce the scope of quantitative credit 
controls and non-price rationing are also crucial for fi-
nancial progress in Costa Rica. This, in turn, is a precon-
dition for a successful economic recovery. 
Costa Rica faces a major challenge. Beyond the need for a 
continuing concern for fiscal and monetary stability, where much 
progress has been made, but where control has not been entirely 
achieved yet, the authorities must undertake a complete revision 
of the country's development strategy and facilitate a major re-
allocation of resources. The financial sector must play a key 
role in this process. This cannot be accomplished, however, with 
marginal procedural interventions or specific credit projects. 
The effort will be successful only if the whole financial system 
is involved, including both the state-owned and the private in-
termediaries, both bank and non-bank institutions. 
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The USAID must continue with these efforts, which will lead 
to particularly substantial fruits in the medium term. Support 
for the private banks and other non-bank private financial inter-
mediaries will not be, nevertheless, sufficient to remove the ob-
stacles faced at present by numerous agricultural producers. A 
short-term strategy, including the state-owned banks, is needed. 
Despite the rapid changes in market structure observed, the 
state-owned banks still represent the bulk of the financial sys-
tem. This is particularly true when one considers, not only the 
amounts of credit disbursed, but also the number of clients (bor-
rowers as well as depositors) with access to their services. By 
the mere fact of their size, the performance of the state-owned 
banks critically influences the quality of the financial services 
provided and, thereby, the extent to which the financial system 
is, in the aggregate, contributing to rapid economic growth and 
structural transformation. If these banks remain grossly inef-
ficient, they will impose major constraints on other private eco-
nomic activities. 
Moreover, it is clear that the private banks are more effi-
cient (cost effective) than the state-owned banks in the specific 
areas of their operations, which are rather restricted. Because 
of the profit objectives that they pursue and of their much less 
bureaucratic constraints and political interferences, they can 
become, in the long run, more efficient than the state-owned 
banks in other areas of operation. Potentially oligopolistic be-
havior might, however, reduce this efficiency. 
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Conclusion Number Five: 
The state-owned banks cannot be ignored in an effort to im-
prove the Costa Rican financial system, in view of their 
size, the extent of their infrastructure, their monopoly of 
monetary deposit mobilization, and the heterogeneous nature 
of their operations. 
There are several reasons that suggest that the most ef f ec-
ti ve strategy for the improvement of the Costa Rican financial 
system involves the promotion of several types of intermediary, 
including a substantial effort to upgrade the performance of the 
state-owned banks. Arguments to include the government banks in 
the effort are: 
(a) Because of their size, even comparatively minor improve-
ments in the efficiency of the state-owned banks will weight very 
large. 
If, on the other hand, the performance of these banks is not 
improved, their inefficiency will represent a major bottleneck to 
the expansion of the private non-financial sectors as well as a 
critical constraint to the process of structural adjustment. 
(b) There are two ways to promote private-sector development 
in Costa Rica: through the expansion of the private banks, with 
most of the potential gains in the medium term, and through the 
removal of one of the major constraints to private-sector devel-
opment, namely, the inefficiency of the state-owned banks, which 
has immediate short-run implications. 
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a major source of their funding will be public. Abundant access 
to these funds may reduce the need or desire to mobilize domestic 
resources. Credit allocation criteria may be distorted by the 
source of the funding. 
Moreover, although the monopoly in the mobilization of mone-
tary deposits allows the state-owned banks to provide a service 
of lower quality to its depositors (in particular, to impose on 
them high transactions costs), oligopolistic tendencies within 
the private banks may result in allocations of loanable funds 
that do not necessarily always reflect social profitability. In 
particular, the private banks may be in a position to favor, in 
their credit allocation decisions, groups of investors closely 
related to the bank, and to transfer to them the subsidy implicit 
in flows of public (donor) funds to these institutions. 
Furthermore, the provision of deposit services is as impor-
tant for economic efficiency and growth as the granting of loans. 
Deposit services in Costa Rica have been of very low quality and 
the state-owned banks have not implemented a consistent deposit 
mobilization strategy, particularly in the rural areas (Poyo, 
1988). Improvement of this dimension of the financial market re-
quires, in view of the legal monopoly, concern with the efficien-
cy of the state-owned banks. 
(d) The state-owned banks possess an extensive infrastruc-
ture of branches, which allows them to cost-effectively reach an 
ample clientele, particularly in the rural areas, beyond the pre-
sent capabilities of the private banks. 
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Unles the state-owned commercial banks compensate with lower 
transactions costs and better service the loss of subsidies for 
their clients, too strong political pressures will develop that 
may cause a reversal of the new policy orientation. 
In effect, given the political economy environment, the four 
state-owned banks must become more efficient, for the reforms not 
to be rejected. Poor quality of service at the state-owned banks 
may even generate a political backlash of restrictions and su-
pression against the private commercial banks. This will be par-
ticularly unfortunate, since the reforms are key for a recovery. 
The identification of deficiencies and problems in an eva-
luation of the performance of the state-owned banks was not a 
surprise. Earlier studies had already uncovered many of these 
shortcomings, while theoretical considerations about the nature 
of the institutional structure and set of incentives for decision 
making in the state-owned banks predicted these findings. The 
presence of a significant process of change and of major insti-
tutional tensions leading towards an improvement in their per-
formance and viability, on the other hand, was a major surprise 
(Cedeno, 1988; Jimenez, 1988). 
The presence of this internally-generated process of change, 
albeit as a response to deregulation and competition in the mar-
ket, suggests the existence of a viable, feasible opportunity for 
improvement. The identification of the major deficiencies indi-
cated areas of possible intervention for the authorities and the 
donors. 
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(b) Deposit mobilization is not viewed as a service to the 
clients, but mostly as an activity complementary of lending, 
required to purchase the •inputs" for the production of loans. 
There is not an overall strategy of deposit mobilization, but 
rather ad hoc reactions to the demands for loanable funds at par-
ticular moments. Financial intermediation, however, must be a 
service for both depositors and borrowers. 
The state-owned banks have been, for the most part, borrow-
er-dominated agencies, concerned with disbursing funds, but with 
little preoccupation for the quality of the services offered to 
depositors. Rural deposit mobilization has been entirely ignored. 
This is a major deficiency that needs to be corrected. Such an 
effort offers substantial room for gains both for the banks and 
their clients. 
(c) The transactions costs imposed on the clients (borrowers 
and depositors) of the state-owned banks have, in general, been 
extremely high and, until recently, these banks had shown no un-
derstanding or concern for these costs. Recent studies about 
borrowing and lending costs show that these are high, greatly 
dispersed, and highly correlated with loan size (Gonzalez-Vega 
and Gonzalez-Garita, 1988). As a result, transactions costs have 
a very regressive impact on distribution. 
Small and risky producers find that the total cost of insti-
tutional funds is very high, while depositors find that the net 
returns to their savings are very low. High costs of lending and 
of mobilizing funds further reduce bank financial viability. 
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Several circumstances indicate that there is willingness and 
scope for improvement within the state-owned banks, including: 
(a) New managerial teams that have been able to define con-
sistent objectives for the institutions and that are committed to 
change. 
(b) Numerous new initiatives for improvement in procedures 
and the quality of the services offered, many of which have been 
promoted by the mid-levels of the staff. The old bureaucracy has 
been slowly replaced by better-trained staff. 
(c) A new awareness that the client's interests, rather than 
regulations, procedure, or documentation should guide efforts of 
reform. 
(d) The desire to introduce new products, compete, and be 
flexible, in order to survive in a deregulated, more competitive 
market. 
(e) The quality of the stock of human capital at the banks, 
combined with a willingness to improve and adjust to changes in 
the environment. 
The greatest threat to the commercial banks will always be 
their vulnerability to political intrusion* (Mesalles, 1988). 
This, and the potential conflicts of objectives in decision-mak-
ing, will always be a limitation of the state-owned banks. They 
will continue to be, however, a most important component of the 
Costa Rican financial system. The challenge is, therefore, how 
to support their improvement and, at the same time, provide them 
with defenses against these intrusions. 
• 
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